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Any two-party cryptographic primitive can be implemented using quantum communication under
the assumption that it is difficult to store a large number of quantum states perfectly. However,
achieving reliable quantum communication over long distances remains a difficult problem. Here, we
consider a large network of nodes with only neighboring quantum links. We exploit properties of this
cloud of nodes to enable any two nodes to achieve security even if they are not directly connected.
Our results are based on techniques from classical cryptography and do not resort to technologically
difficult procedures like entanglement swapping. More precisely, we show that oblivious transfer can
be achieved in such a network if and only if there exists a path in the network between the sender
and the receiver along which all nodes are honest. Finally, we show that useful notions of security
can still be achieved when we relax the assumption of an honest path. For example, we show that
we can combine our protocol for oblivious transfer with computational assumptions such that we
obtain security if either there exists an honest path, or, as a backup, at least the adversary cannot
solve a computational problem.
Quantum communication allows us to achieve crypto-
graphic security without relying on unproven computa-
tional assumptions. Two nodes, Alice and Bob, can es-
tablish a secure key using quantum key distribution [1, 2],
and, moreover, solve any two-party cryptographic prob-
lem even if they do not trust each other in the noisy-
storage model [3–5]. Well-known examples of such prob-
lems include secure identification [6], as well as electronic
voting and secure auctions. More generally, Alice and
Bob wish to solve problems where Alice holds an input x
(eg. the amount of money she is willing to bid for an item
sold by Bob) and Bob holds an input y (e.g. his mini-
mum asking price), and they want to obtain the value of
some function f(x, y) (e.g. output no if x < y, and x
otherwise) as depicted below. In this setting, there is no
outside eavesdropper but Alice or Bob themselves may
be dishonest. Security thereby means that Alice should
not learn anything about y and Bob should not learn
anything about x, apart from what can be inferred from
the value of f(x, y) [7].
Unfortunately, quantum communication over long dis-
tances poses a formidable problem. At present, quantum
key distribution has been achieved over a distance of at
most 145km in fiber [8] or 144km in freespace [9, 10].
In addition, having a direct communication link between
any two nodes that may wish to communicate is an infea-
sible problem even when it comes to classical communi-
cation. Instead, we have networks of nodes, such as the
present day internet, in which only some nodes are di-
rectly connected, but are willing to relay communication
for other nodes who do not share a direct link. Typically
it is easy to connect two nodes who are physically close.
In order to achieve longer distances, many forms of quan-
tum repeaters have been proposed in order extend the
range of quantum communication to obtain a quantum
version of the internet [11, 12]. Broadly speaking, quan-
tum repeaters used in key distribution come in two vari-
ants: in the first, the nodes along the path between Alice
and Bob are trusted, and we perform quantum key dis-
tribution between each two neighbours. This form of re-
peater is known as trusted relay and was for example used
in the network of SECOQC [13]. The second method is to
have the intermediary nodes create entanglement, allow-
ing Alice and Bob to create entanglement between them
using the concept of entanglement swapping [14]. This is
clearly more desirable than relying on trusted relays, but
technologically very difficult to achieve especially when
there are many intermediary nodes. Many experiments
have been done over the last twelve years [15–17], but
still we are far from using this technology for QKD [13],
and similarly for the case of two-party computation in
the noisy-storage model. What both of these approaches
have in common is that they first try to create the analog
of a point-to-point link between Alice and Bob to solve
the final cryptographic task.
Here, we take a novel approach using techniques from
classical cryptography to bridge the potentially large
physical distance between Alice and Bob. Concretely,
we for the first time consider the case where any two
nodes that are directly connected by a (quantum) com-
munication link can securely solve the universal crypto-
graphic problem of oblivious transfer (OT), which in turn
enables them to solve any two-party cryptographic prob-
lem [18]. Implementations of such protocols (link-OT)
can be found in noisy-storage model [3–5]. Any node in
the network may behave honestly, or be dishonest in the
sense that it will collaborate with the dishonest Alice or
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2FIG. 1: If any two nodes with a direct link can perform oblivious
transfer, then Alice and Bob can solve any two-party cryptographic
problem as long as there exists a path from Alice to Bob (e.g., 3 and
4) along which all intermediary nodes are honest, or the cheating party
cannot solve a computational problem efficiently.
Bob. A dishonest node also has full control over the com-
munication links attached to it, making it more powerful
than for example the eavesdropper in QKD who only has
access to the communication link and not to any of the
individual labs.
Results We first provide a simple protocol for obliv-
ious transfer between Alice and Bob, who do not share a
direct quantum link, that is secure, as long as all nodes
along one of the paths from Alice to Bob are honest (path-
OT). We will refer to this path as an honest path from
Alice to Bob, which is in flavor similar to recent exten-
sions to the idea of trusted relays for QKD [19]. However,
we prove that this is in fact all we can hope to achieve
for secure two-party computation without any additional
resources: Given only the resource of link-OT and clas-
sical communication, no protocol between Alice and Bob
can be secure without the existence of an honest path.
Furthermore, we show that link-OT is in fact a necessary
condition for any protocol to be secure, i.e., having access
to a large network of nodes does not allow us to solve the
problem of oblivious transfer on its own [27].
Then, we successively relax the assumption of an hon-
est path. First, since relying on an honest path alone
may still be rather unsatisfactory, we show that we can
add a security backup in the sense that our protocol can
be made secure if there is either an honest path, or at
least the dishonest node cannot break a computational
assumption. We then show that the assumption of the
honest path can be relaxed if each pair of nodes are given
a classical shared key for free, and finally that a non-
trivial notion of security is still achievable for a node,
even if everyone else in the network is dishonest.
Our results open the door for extending implementa-
tions of oblivious transfer in the noisy-storage model to
large distances similar to the case of QKD [13].
THE PROTOCOL
Let us first explain the problem of oblivious transfer
(OT) [20]; a formal definition can be found in [4]. Alice
(the sender) holds two input strings s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}` [28]
and Bob (the receiver) holds a choice bit c ∈ {0, 1}. If
both nodes are honest, Bob should receive the input of his
choosing, sc, at the end of the protocol. If Bob is honest,
then our goal is to ensure that whatever attack Alice may
mount, she can nevertheless not gain any information
about c. Conversely, if Alice is honest, we want that a
dishonest Bob is unable to gain any information about
at least one of Alice’s inputs, s1−c. Whereas oblivious
transfer by itself may seem like a rather obscure task, it
has in fact been shown that Alice and Bob can use it
to solve any other cryptographic problem securely [18].
Below we use OT((s0, s1), c) to indicate that we use a
link-OT protocol as a black box.
We now provide two protocols, where the first is un-
conditionally secure for the sender Alice [29] and secure
for the receiver Bob provided there is an honest path.
The second has exactly opposite security properties: it is
unconditionally secure for Bob and secure for Alice pro-
vided there is an honest path. Let N be the number of
paths connecting Alice to Bob and denote by v1, . . . , vN
the nodes adjacent to Alice on the N possible paths. We
use ’+’ and ’·’ to indicate bitwise addition and multipli-
cation modulo 2 respectively, and ∈R to denote that a
variable has been chosen uniformly and independently at
random.
Protocol 1:
Input: s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}` for Alice, c ∈ {0, 1} for Bob
Output: sc to Bob.
Bob: Chooses N bits c1, . . . , cN ∈R {0, 1} such that
c = c1 + . . .+ cN . He sends cj to node vj along
the j-th path.
Alice: Chooses N keys r1, . . . , rN ∈R {0, 1}` such
that r1 + . . . + rN = 0.
Performs OT((t0,1, t1,1), c1) with t0,1 = s0 +
r1 and t1,1 = s1 + r1 with node v1, and
OT((t0,j , t1,j), cj) with t0,j = rj and t1,j =
s0 + s1 + rj with nodes v2, . . . , vN .
Intermediary Nodes: Node vj sends tcj ,j to Bob
along the j-th path.
Bob: Computes sc = tc1,1 + . . . + tcN ,N .
First, the protocol is correct when both players are
honest, since Bob computes
sc = tc1,1 + . . . + tcN ,N = s0 + (s0 + s1) · c (1)
We now argue that the protocol is also secure; details
can be found in the appendix. Suppose first that Bob
3is dishonest. Since Alice uses fresh keys {rj}j in each
round, and s0 and s1 are themselves randomly chosen
bit strings unknown to Bob, Bob would need to retrieve
at least N + 1 entries tcj ,j in order to compute both s0
and s1. However, even if Bob is working together with
all intermediary nodes, he can only learn at most one of
(t0,j , t1,j) from each of the N link-OTs with Alice. Hence,
Bob learns nothing about one of s0 or s1 as desired.
Suppose now that Bob is honest, and there exists an
honest path between Alice and Bob. Note that Bob ef-
fectively performs a secret sharing of his input along all
paths, so that Alice needs all shares in order to recover
c [21]. However, the share on the honest-path remains
unknown to Alice. The security of the link-OT ensures
she cannot use it to gain any information about c either.
Our second protocol is similar, but with Alice perform-
ing a secret sharing of her inputs. Let w1, . . . , wN be the
nodes adjacent to Bob on the N possible paths.
Protocol 2:
Input: s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}` for Alice, c ∈ {0, 1} for Bob
Output: sc to Bob.
Alice: Chooses N strings s01, . . . , s0N ∈R {0, 1}`
such that s0 = s01 + . . . + s0N and similarly
s11, . . . , s1N ∈R {0, 1}` such that s1 = s11 +
. . .+s1N . She sends bits s0j , s1j to node wj , i.e.
the j-th neighbour of Bob via the j-th path.
Bob: Performs OT((s0j , s1j), c) with node wj . Com-
putes sc = sc1 + . . . + scN .
Clearly, the protocol is correct if both parties are hon-
est. The security of the link-OT for the receiver ensures
that even if a dishonest Alice controls all nodes adjacent
to Bob, she nevertheless cannot learn c. Finally, the pro-
tocol is secure against a dishonest Bob, assuming that
there exists an honest path: In this case, at least one of
the shares s0j or s1j remains unknown to Bob, since they
are securely transmitted to node wj via the honest path,
and the link-OT protocol between wj and Bob is secure
for the sender. Hence, he cannot learn both inputs s0, s1.
One may wonder whether we could have constructed a
path-OT protocol without relying on the existence of a
link-OT protocol, which is impossible to obtain without
assumptions [22]. However, it is easy to see that the
existence of any path-OT protocol would imply a secure
link-OT protocol between two directly connected parties,
Anne and Bill: First, Anne picks a path from Alice to
Bob in the original setting. Then Bill picks a path from
Bob to Alice. The remaining paths they split arbitrarily.
Now Anne acts as Alice would and in addition simulates
the action of all nodes in the paths assigned to her. Bill
also simulates the actions of Bob together with all nodes
in the paths assigned to him. Clearly, no matter who will
be dishonest, we are always in the setting where there is
an honest path in the original protocol, as one path is
always simulated by someone being honest. This means
that we cannot hope to achieve OT in the honest-path
model without additional assumptions either [22].
SECURITY WITHOUT AN HONEST PATH
However, one might still hope that given such a strong
primitive as link-OT we might be able to achieve security
using only classical communication, even without the as-
sumption of an honest path. Unfortunately, it turns out
that an honest path is indeed a necessary condition for
security: If there is no honest path, then there exists a
subset of corrupted nodes M , such that any communi-
cation between Alice and Bob goes through them. Intu-
itively (see appendix for details) this means that either M
can gain information about c, or else must know enough
about s0 and s1 to be able to supply Bob with the desired
output. In the first case, dishonest Alice can learn c from
M , and in the second dishonest Bob can break security
by learning information about both of Alice’s inputs.
A security backup: Nevertheless, the assumption of
an honest path may appear quite strong, and it would be
useful to have some security guarantees even if this as-
sumption fails. Fortunately, it is straightforward to adopt
existing techniques from classical cryptography [23, 24] to
extend our protocols to be secure if either the honest-path
assumption holds, or else if the dishonest party cannot
break a certain computational problem. To this end, we
combine our protocol with a protocol for classical oblivi-
ous transfer. OT can be achieved classically under a large
variety of assumptions. Here, we choose to combine our
protocol with the protocol of Naor and Pinkas [25], which
is secure against a dishonest sender if he cannot break the
decisional Diffie Hellman problem (DDH), and uncondi-
tionally secure against a dishonest receiver. Note that
this means that just like for our honest-path assump-
tion, we have unconditional security against one party,
and security according to either the DDH or the honest-
path assumption against the other [30]. Using the {3, 2}-
robust uniform OT-combiner from [24, Theorem 2] we
hence immediately obtain that there exists an oblivious
transfer protocol that is secure if either the honest path
or the DDH assumption holds using two instances of pro-
tocol 1, and two instances of the OT protocol of [25]. An
explicit protocol can be found in [24].
Secret keys: In the classical model for secure multi-
party computation one usually assumes that there exist
private links between all nodes and we are trying to show
security against subsets of dishonest nodes. Clearly, this
is a strong assumption as it requires us to establish keys
over potentially long distances. Nevertheless, it is in-
teresting to consider a hybrid-model, where there exists
a complete network of classical private links and also a
network of quantum links between neighboring nodes al-
4lowing them to perform link-OT. It is easy to see that
our protocol can be transformed to achieve security as
long as one of the neighbours of Alice and Bob is hon-
est, instead of the entire path being honest: we use the
private channels to directly communicate with the im-
mediate neighbours instead of relying on the entire path.
This easy example shows that allowing link-OT is indeed
more powerful than what one can hope to gain in the
classical model of secure multi-party computation.
No assumptions: Finally, let us consider what hap-
pens if we allow an arbitrary number of network nodes
to be dishonest. Curiously, some weak notion of security
still remains. More specifically, by performing our two
protocols sequentially with different inputs for Alice and
Bob in the two executions, we can trivially construct a
form of path-OT where Alice has four inputs, and Bob
has two choice bits such that: if everyone is honest, then
Bob learns two of the four bits, and Alice learns nothing
about Bob’s two index bits. If Alice is honest, but ev-
eryone else in the network is dishonest, then Bob learns
three bits, but not all four of them. If Bob is honest,
but everyone else is dishonest, then Alice learns one of
the two index bits of Bob, but not both of them. These
properties follow directly from our previous analysis.
Note that this weak form of security is still impossible
classically on a complete network with private links, un-
less computational assumptions are added. In our model,
it becomes possible because we added the neighboring
quantum links and assumed that we can perform short
distance OT protocols via these quantum links. One can
turn this weak OT protocol into some weak bit com-
mitment protocol as well, leading to weak forms of coin
tossing over long distances.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown security against dishonest Alice (or
Bob) whenever there is at least one honest path, or the
dishonest party cannot break a computational assump-
tion. One can easily extend our protocol to be robust
against the case where the intermediary nodes may be
dishonest independently of Alice and Bob, and try to al-
ter Alice’s or Bob’s input. In our present protocols this
is of course possible since they could for example flip one
of the bits {cj}j . To make the protocol robust we can
simply use a more advanced secret sharing scheme that,
similar to an error correcting code, protects against ‘er-
rors’ introduced in the secrets [26]. Note that depending
on our choice of secret sharing scheme, we may require
more than one honest path to achieve robustness or more
communciation rounds [31].
Our protocols show that two-party cryptographic
primitives can be implemented over long distances in an
extremely simple manner. Our result enables us to ex-
tend the range of protocols in the noisy-storage model in
a similar way as has been done in QKD [13]. Clearly, our
protocols still require a considerable amount of classical
communication. However, this is technologically much
easier to achieve than entanglement swapping which of
course still remains the more desirable solution. The
quantum operations that the nodes are performing are
no harder than the ones necessary in the link-OT proto-
cols, i.e. it suffices that they create and measure BB84 [1]
states [4]. No complicated operations like Bell state mea-
surements, or memory are required.
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SECURITY OF PROTOCOL 1
Whereas we ideally show security using the formal defi-
nitions for fully-randomized OT [4], we restrict ourselves
to the simple arguments below in order to not obscure
our argument, which is sufficient since our setting is very
straightforward to analyze.
Claim 1.1. Protocol 1 forms a secure oblivious transfer
scheme with unconditional security against Alice, and se-
curity against Bob whenever there exists an honest path.
Proof. We first show that the protocol is correct when
both Alice and Bob are honest. This follows immediately
by noting that Bob can compute
sc = tc1,1 + . . . + tcN ,N (2)
= (s0 + (s0 + s1) · c1 + r1) +
N∑
i=2
((s0 + s1) · ci + r2)
= s0 + (s0 + s1) · c = sc .
We now show that the protocol is secure if Alice is hon-
est, where we allow all intermediary players and Bob to
be dishonest. From the security of the link-OT protocol,
it follows that Bob can learn at most one of Alice’s inputs
from each invocation. In the most general cheating strat-
egy, Bob can arbitrarily choose values as his input bits to
the N link-OT protocols. Let d1, d2, . . . , dN denote these
inputs and let td1,1, . . . , tdN ,N be the inputs of Alice that
Bob learns. Note that for any choice of Bob’s inputs {di}i
there exists a c ∈ {0, 1} such that td1,1 + . . .+ tdN ,N = sc.
Moreover, td1,1 + . . .+ tdN−1,N−1 + t1−dN ,N = s1−c. Our
goal is now to show that Bob cannot gain any information
about s1−c. First of all, note that since Alice uses fresh
keys {rj}j in each link-OT, and s0 and s1 are themselves
randomly chosen bit strings unknown to Bob, the val-
ues of td1,1, . . . , tdN ,N and t1−dN ,N are all independent.
Hence, Bob would need to retrieve all such N + 1 entries
in order to compute both s0 and s1, which contradicts
the security of the link-OT.
It remains to prove security if Bob is honest. Note that
Bob effectively performs a secret sharing of his input
c =
∑
j∈{1,...,N}
cj (3)
along all paths such that the bit c can only be recovered
if and only if Alice learns all shares {cj}j . However,
Alice has no information about the value of cj on the
honest-path as links between honest players are secure.
Furthermore, the link-OT used between Alice and vj is
secure for the receiver, and hence we conclude that Alice
cannot learn c as promised.
NECESSITY OF THE HONEST PATH
We now prove that an honest-path is a necessary con-
dition for OT, where we use a weaker definition which is
implied by the formal ones given e.g. for (fully random-
ized) oblivious transfer in [4]. Note that this is sufficient
to prove the impossibility of the more difficult task as
well. More concretely, the following conditions must hold
for any protocol that is both correct and secure. Any im-
possibility proof for a protocol aiming for perfect security
is rather unsatisfactory since we would be willing to ac-
cept a very small probability of failure. We hence include
a security parameter ε > 0 which intuitively corresponds
to the error we are willing to accept.
6First of all, for any protocol that is correct we must
have that the probability that honest Bob with input c
can guess honest Alice’s input, sc, satisfies
Correctness: Pr[sc|Bob] ≥ 1− ε . (4)
Furthermore, if Alice is honest, then for whatever attack
Bob may conceive we have that he cannot guess at least
one of the two inputs
Security against Bob: ∃b Pr[sb|Bob] ≤ 1
2`
+ ε , (5)
Finally, if Bob is honest and his input bit is c, then for
any strategy of dishonest Alice, she is unable to learn
Bob’s choice bit
Security against Alice: Pr[c|Alice] ≤ 1
2
+ ε . (6)
To obtain an impossibility proof, our goal is now to
show that (4), (5) and (6) can never be satisfied simulta-
neously for small values of ε. That is, we can only hope to
achieve very imperfect version of oblivious transfer with
a large error ε.
Claim 1.2. There exists no protocol for oblivious trans-
fer based on only link-OT and classical communication
that is secure without an honest path between Alice and
Bob with security parameter ε < 1/4− 1/2`+2.
Proof. If there is no honest path, then there exists some
subset of potentially dishonest nodes M that separates
the network into two disconnected components, one con-
taining Alice and the other Bob. Let us now establish
some basic properties of the probabilities that Alice, Bob
or M can learn s0, s1 and c in an honest execution of any
protocol.
Note that in any protocol, Bob cannot gain more infor-
mation about Alice’s inputs than M can, since all infor-
mation between Alice and Bob runs through M (wlog we
can furthermore assume that dishonest Bob would give
any shared secret keys with Alice to M for free). Hence,
we have that
∀b Pr[sb|Bob] ≤ Pr[sb|M ] . (7)
Similarly, Alice cannot gain more information about
Bob’s input than M can, hence
Pr[c|Alice] ≤ Pr[c|M ] . (8)
First, suppose that for an honest execution of any pro-
tocol the probability that M is able to guess c satisfies
Pr[c|M ] > 1/2 + ε. Then, Alice can violate the security
condition (6) by running the protocol honestly with Bob
and then asking M for a guess of c. Hence, it must hold
that
Pr[c|M ] ≤ 1
2
+ ε . (9)
Second, by the correctness condition (4) and equa-
tion (7), for an honest execution of any protocol, we have
Pr[sc|M ] ≥ 1− ε . (10)
Third, suppose that for an honest execution of any pro-
tocol, Pr[s1−c|M ] > 12` + ε. Then, Bob can violate the
security condition (5) by running the protocol honestly
with Alice and then asking M for a guess for both s0 and
s1. Hence, it must hold that
Pr[s1−c|M ] ≤ 1
2`
+ ε . (11)
We now show that these conditions imply that whenever
Bob is honest, there exists a cheating strategy for Alice.
Alice first chooses two random inputs s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}`,
and runs the protocol as an honest Alice would do. Af-
terwards, she picks a random b and asks M , who by def-
inition will willingly cooperate with any cheating party,
to send her a guess s˜b for sb. Note that (10) and (11) now
tell us that the probability that M succeeds is very large
for sc, but extremely small for s1−c. Alice then outputs
b as her guess for c if M guessed correctly and 1 − b if
M guessed wrongly. The probability that Alice succeeds
using this strategy obeys
Pr[c|Alice] (12)
= Pr[b = c] Pr[sc|M ] + Pr[b = 1− c](1− Pr[s1−c|M ])
≥ 1
2
(1− ε) + 1
2
(1− 1
2`
− ε) (13)
= (1− ε− 1
2`+1
) . (14)
Comparing (14) with (6) concludes our claim.
Note, however, that OT is of course possible if M
would be fully quantum, and in particular would be able
to perform entanglement swapping between Alice and
Bob.
